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The European Union would benefit from a new
approach to ensure the security of its gas supply,
not least because gas imports are likely to
increase. The EU’s existing gas infrastructure is
sufficient to buffer a major supply shock.
Therefore, instead of focusing on expensive
policies to stimulate supply diversification and to
reduce of dependence on imports, the aim should
be to find a way to maintain an adequate level of
flexibility and make it available when needed.
This could be done by creating an EU market for a
gas security margin, which could be an asset for
the EU in the context of the unpredictable nature
of gas supplies, with countries today perceived as
secure being potentially affected by supply
interruptions in the future, and the need to
overcome the current EU patchwork of fragmented
national and technology-specific supply-security
measures. The market for a gas security margin
would be designed to have the lowest possible
cost by relying on the cheapest flexibility options
available, and by shielding the internal gas market
from ad-hoc intervention. The distributive effects
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and the political feasibility of such approach
would have to be taken into account.
THE EU GAS MARKET: CURRENT TRENDS AND
FUTURE SCENARIOS
In the midst of the 2014 Ukraine crisis, concerns
about a potential politically motivated disruption
of all EU gas supplies from Russia, and especially
those that pass through Ukraine, triggered a
discussion on creating an Energy Union to counter
this threat (Zachmann, 2014). These discussions
lifted energy issues to the top of the agenda of the
European Commission under its president Jean-
Claude Juncker (European Commission, 2014).
The high priority given to gas supplies arose
because: (1) gas represents about one quarter of
the EU energy mix; (2) about one third of this
gas is imported from Russia; and (3) in contrast
to oil or coal, it is not possible to bring large
amounts of gas to where it is needed if the
corresponding infrastructure is not in place
(Figure 1).
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Figure 1: The EU gas market: current trends
Source: Bruegel on the basis of BP (2015).
Note: Demand/supply diﬀerence is a result of re-exports of LNG, stock changes (eg medium-term storage, regasiﬁcation
terminals) and transportation losses.
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This implies the EU is vulnerable to a few external
suppliers that might, at any moment, cut their
supplies for technical or geopolitical reasons.
On this point a caveat is necessary: while the EU
security of gas supply debate is often exclusively
concentrated on Russia and on the related fears
about its geopolitical use of gas, the issue is in
reality much wider because it potentially encom-
passes gas supplies from all suppliers, which
might be interrupted for either technical or geopo-
litical reasons. For instance, a traditionally secure
supplier as Norway might need to reduce its gas
exports in the future simply because of depleting
resources, or Algeria, another traditionally secure
supplier, might cut its supplies in case of unpre-
dictable regional political turbulence. Security of
gas supply is therefore an issue that concerns all
EU member states.
The EU’s vulnerability to gas import disruptions is
set to remain because, even assuming a stagnant
outlook for EU gas demand, import requirements
will likely grow because of rapidly declining
domestic production. In the Netherlands, gas pro-
duction dropped from 70 billion cubic metres
(bcm) in 2010 to 56 bcm in 2014. This declining
trend is set to accelerate after the production
cap imposed in 2015 on Europe's largest gas field
– Groningen – because of more powerful and
more frequent earthquakes resulting from the
extraction activities. The United Kingdom’s gas
production volume declined from 57 bcm in 2010
to 37 bcm in 2014, mainly because of the rapid
depletion of resources in the North Sea.
According to the International Energy Agency (IEA,
2015), the EU’s import requirements will increase
in all scenarios. In the current policies scenario,
which assumes no changes in policies, EU import
requirements will reach 338 bcm in 2020 and 386
bcm in 2040. In the new policies scenario, which
assumes that national pledges to reduce
greenhouse-gas emissions will be translated into
national policies, import requirements will
increase by 36 percent in the period to 2040.
In the 450 scenario, which sets out an energy
pathway consistent with the goal of limiting the
global increase in temperature to two degrees
Celsius, EU import requirements will peak at 242
bcm in 2030 (Figure 2).
That gas imports and thus gas supply security will
remain crucial issues for the EU is implicitly
acknowledged by the engagement of European
gas companies and member states in the devel-
opment of new gas supply routes such as Nord
Stream II, South Stream and Turk Stream.
EU GAS INFRASTRUCTURE: AN OVERVIEW
Based on past expectations– which proved to be
wrong – of strongly growing EU gas demand,
suppliers developed substantial import and stor-
age infrastructure over the last few decades (Table
1). The capacity of the import pipelines from
Russia, Norway, Algeria and Libya alone (422
bcm) would be sufficient to more than satisfy cur-
rent EU gas import requirements (255 bcm) (BP,
2015). In addition, several member states have
installed a total of 183 bcm of liquefied natural gas
(LNG) import infrastructure (GIIGNL, 2014). The
excess size of these infrastructures relative to
actual EU gas demand explains their low rates of
utilisation: 58 percent for import pipelines and 32
Current policy scenario                                               New policy scenario                                                        450 scenario
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Figure 2: EU gas demand, production and import requirements (bcm): future scenarios
Source: Bruegel based on IEA (2015).
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percent for LNG terminals. By contrast, only 18
percent of the 92 bcm of EU gas storage capacity
(GIE, 2015) is currently not used.
ESTIMATING THE MARGIN OF FLEXIBILITY OF THE
EU GAS SYSTEM
Security of gas supply should not be defined in
terms of import share or share of the largest
supplier, but in terms of availability of alternative
supplies in case of crisis. In other words, the EU
should not be concerned by the presence of a few
key suppliers in its import portfolio if it has at its
disposal alternative supplies that can be tapped
into in case one of the key suppliers cuts its
supply for any reason. 
This also means that even significant reductions
Table 1: EU gas infrastructure: import pipelines, LNG and storage
Pipelines (bcm/y)
From Capacity Imports in 2014 Utilisation rate
Russia 230* 119 51%
Norway 127 101.1 79%
Algeria 54 19.5 36%
Libya 11 6 54%
TOTAL 422 245.6 58%
LNG (bcm/y)
Country Capacity Imports in 2014(Net of re-exports) Utilisation rate
Spain 60.2 17.6 29%
United Kingdom 50.7 18.5 36%
France 25.3 10.1 39%
Italy 15.3 7.2 47%
Netherlands 12 0.9 7%
Belgium 9 2.1 23%
Portugal 5.5 2.1 38%
Greece 5.2 0.8 15%
Lithuania 4 n.a. n.a.
Sweden 0.3 n.a. n.a.
TOTAL 183.5 59.3 32%
Storage (bcm)
Country Capacity Level at October 2015 Utilisation rate at October 2015
Germany 22.3 17 76%
Italy 16.6 15.8 94%
France 12 10.3 86%
The Netherlands 8.8 8.7 98%
Hungary 6.2 3 48%
Austria 4.7 3.2 68%
United Kingdom 4.1 3.7 89%
Czech Republic 3.3 3.1 95%
Slovakia 3 2.2 71%
Poland 2.8 2.7 95%
Spain 2.6 1.9 74%
Latvia 2.3 2 86%
Denmark 1 0.8 82%
Belgium 0.8 0.4 54%
Croatia 0.6 0.5 90%
Bulgaria 0.6 0.4 73%
Portugal 0.3 0.1 44%
TOTAL 91.9 75.8 82%
Source: Bruegel based on BP (2015), GIE (2015), GIIGNL (2015), IEA (2015).
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1. Calculated as follows:
pipeline imports: 2014
data, IEA (2015); pipeline
imports margin: 2013 peak
– 2014 data, IEA (2015);
LNG imports: 2014 data,
GIIGNL (2015); LNG imports
margin: total capacity –
imports 2014, GIIGNL
(2015); domestic produc-
tion: 2014 data, BP (2015);
domestic production
margin: Netherlands 2010
peak – Netherlands 2014
data, BP (2015); storage:
minimum level, April 2013,
GIE (2015); fuel switching
potential: 50 percent of
2013 gas consumption in
power generation, Eurogas
(2014); interruptible
clients: 10 percent of 2013
gas consumption in indus-
try, Eurogas (2014);
demand: 2014 and average
2009-14, BP (2015).
in imports from individual suppliers might not
mitigate the EU’s dependency. Even halving the
share of gas imports from the largest single
supplier, from more than 30 percent to 15 percent,
could cause people to freeze in winter and indus-
try to suffer, if the 15 percent cannot be made up
from other sources. At the same time, even if all
the gas came from one supplier, the EU need not
be concerned, as long as it has credible alterna-
tives to replace these supplies. So, security of gas
supply means that the volume of the unused
options should be greater than the greatest pos-
sible shortfall. It is not about the volume of the
used options. In the following, we show that the EU
has plenty of unused options in its gas infrastruc-
ture system.
The low utilisation rates of import pipelines and
LNG are the first indicators that the EU gas system
has a substantial margin of flexibility or, in other
words, a substantial set of unused alternatives
that could be tapped into for an indefinite
period of time in case of supply disruption from a
key supplier. 
To illustrate this flexibility we estimate the margin
of flexibility for a whole year (Figure 3, left panel),
which in addition to flexibility in the import
infrastructure, also means that supplies to some
interruptible customers might be cut and some
gas-fired power plants might be replaced by power
from other plants. Furthermore, domestic produc-
tion might be slightly ramped up and storage units
might be fully emptied. The full year estimation1
shows that at aggregate level the EU has a solid
margin of flexibility, which could theoretically
even accommodate the loss of the two largest
suppliers, Russia and Norway.
In the short-term (Figure 3, right panel), the critical
issue is using all available flows to meet demand
on the day with the highest demand (peak day).
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Figure 3: The EU margin of flexibility: full year and peak day
Source: Bruegel based on BP (2015), Eurogas (2014), GIE (2015), GIIGNL (2015), IEA (2015).
2. Calculated as follows:
pipeline imports: January
2014/31, IEA (2015);
pipeline imports margin:
(December 2010 – January
2014)/31, IEA (2015); LNG
imports: 2014 data/365,
GIIGNL (2015); LNG imports
margin: (Total capacity –
imports 2014)/365, GIIGNL
(2015); domestic produc-
tion: 2014 data/365, BP
(2015); domestic produc-
tion margin: (Netherlands
2010 peak – Netherlands
2014 data)/365, BP
(2015); storage: DTMTW,
average 2014, GIE (2015);
fuel-switching potential: 50
percent of 2013 gas con-
sumption in power genera-
tion/365, Eurogas (2014);
interruptible clients: 10 per-
cent of 2013 gas consump-
tion in industry/365,
Eurogas (2014); peak
demand: winter 2011-12;
average winters 2009-14,
ENTSOG (2015).
3. “Union policy on energy
shall aim, in a spirit of soli-
darity between Member
States, to ... ensure security
of energy supply in the
Union”.
4. This is due for revision in
early 2016. See
http://ec.europa.eu/smart-
regulation/roadmaps/docs/2
015_ener_017_revision_of_sec
urity_of_gas_supply_en.pdf.
5. See
http://www.bmwi.de/BMWi/R
edaktion/PDF/Publikatio-
nen/Studien/moeglichkeiten
-zur-verbesserung-der-
gasversorgungsicherheit-
und-der-krisenvorsorge-durc
h-regelungen-der-
speicher,property=pdf,bere-
ich=bmwi2012,sprache=de,
rwb=true.pdf.
6. See
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-
agenda/en/connecting-
europe-facility.
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security of gas supply4. In its current form, the
regulation sets out harmonised standards for
infrastructure, supply obligations (under which
consumers must be supplied first in times of
supply crisis) and risk assessment. It also estab-
lishes joint security of supply planning. Finally, it
establishes rules for information exchange and
coordination. The rationale was that “if all Member
States were to comply with minimum standards,
this would enhance solidarity between them in
case of crisis” (European Commission, 2015a). A
report by the European Commission (2015a)
argues that the enforcement of this regulation is
still insufficient and more complete implementa-
tion would strengthen gas supply security.
We would argue that the regulation has so far
proved insufficient to encourage better
coordination between member states in ensuring
security of supply. In fact, looming discussions on
national gas supply security measures (such as
a German gas storage obligation5) illustrate the
trend towards national, technology-specific,
non-market interventions.
A second dedicated EU policy to enhance supply
security is the range of EU programmes to pro-
mote infrastructure investment. In particular, the
projects of common interest, which might receive
financial support from Brussels (under the
Connecting Europe Facility, CEF6), were seen as
pathways to improve supply security. However,
the limited amount of EU support (the CEF has
€4.7 billion for all energy projects from 2014-20)
and the rather political choice of where to allocate
funds has prevented outright success.
Beyond what is strictly required by EU legislation,
member states have national policies to improve
gas security of supply. Several member states
have introduced national storage obligations
(Table 2) and have supported national infrastruc-
ture projects such as LNG terminals or pipeline
projects. Because of their direct powers over the
regulatory framework and over state-owned gas
companies, member states are quite effective in
producing the desired infrastructure.
In this respect, daily delivery capacities are key.
When peak-day demand is much greater than
average demand (EUROGAS, 2014), gas from stor-
age units can meet much of the peak-day demand.
Although reduced, the margin of flexibility shown
in our peak-day estimation2 underlines that there
is considerable room for manoeuvre in an extreme
situation.
On aggregate, the EU could even weather a
complete stop of supply from its largest supplier,
Russia, both on the peak day and over the course
of a year. The picture however changes at
member-state level. Some member states import
most of their gas from a single source and have
only limited domestic flexibility options. Because
of limited interconnection between EU
sub-regions, not all gas that can be made available
in other regions can be sent to where it might be
needed. Certain regions – the Baltic states, Poland
and the Balkans – are far more exposed than
others to the risk of disruption of gas supplies from
Russia. These cases show that a well-intercon-
nected EU gas market is a necessary prerequisite
for robust security of gas supply. The development
of proper interconnections between EU member
states (ie interconnectors and reverse flows on
current pipelines) thus represents the foundation
of any security of gas supply strategy.  
THE CURRENT APPROACHES TO EU GAS SUPPLY
SECURITY
According to the EU Treaty (Art. 194), supply secu-
rity is a competence shared between the EU and
its member states3. The energy article is one of the
twelve places where the Treaty explicitly mentions
‘solidarity’ between member states.
The current European Security of Supply Strategy
(European Commission, 2014), adopted in May
2014, explores a wide range of policy options from
short-term emergency measures to long-term
investment in new technologies. However, the
strategy fails to develop a consistent framework
to manage priorities and trade-offs between the
different measures.
In terms of concrete EU polices, the main legal act
on gas supply security is Regulation (EU) No
994/2010 concerning measures to safeguard
07
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curtailment, storage, liquefied natural gas plants,
pipelines, domestic production or domestic fuels).
Neither the current market design nor ad-hoc
national approaches appear well suited to effi-
ciently ensure security of supply. 
Without an EU framework to safeguard gas supply
security, member states will have to act. But
nationally-decided supply security measures and
infrastructure projects have often detrimental
repercussions beyond their borders. If Lithuania
builds an LNG terminal, Latvia or Estonia might
find it more difficult to finance one, and if Germany
builds an additional pipeline from Russia, south-
east Europe might be more susceptible to Ukraine-
Russian conflict because Russia could then cut
transit through Ukraine without hurting its best
customers in central Europe.
Negative spillovers from national supply-security
policies are not the only reason why security of
gas supply is better pursued at EU level. Gas
supply security should also be addressed at EU
level because: (1) a joint solution is cheaper; risk-
pooling reduces the need for expensive redun-
dancies and enables a more cost-effective
WHY IS AN EU SECURITY OF GAS SUPPLY POLICY
NEEDED?
There is a long-standing debate about whether
completing the EU internal gas market will by itself
deliver supply security. A functioning internal
market offers the most efficient rationing mecha-
nism in times of crisis, and market-based
long-term prices in the EU ensure that suppliers
have the right incentives to develop new sources.
However, the market – which typically opts for the
cheapest available source – might fail to suffi-
ciently diversify. For example, the current market
design will not provide infrastructure to connect
normally uncompetitive sources that can serve as
insurance in case the cheapest supplies become
unavailable.
But nationally-administered approaches, such as
providing security through state-driven invest-
ment in certain infrastructure, run the risk of cre-
ating an unfavourable investment environment for
private investors if not properly shielded from the
market. Furthermore, nationally-administered
approaches regularly fail to select the most effi-
cient portfolio of options (such as demand
Table 2: EU member state storage obligations
Country Storage obligations Security of supply responsibility
Bulgaria
Criteria are not disclosed; Current capacity equals 250
mcm
Bulgargaz
Czech Republic
At least the 20% of supply standards; Current capacity
equals 225 mcm
Market parties
Denmark
Criteria are not disclosed; Storage capacity equals 215
mcm
Energinet.dk, with market based tools
France
Starting from 80% of the estimated seasonal storage
requirements at the start of the heating season
Market parties
Hungary
Strategic storage and storage obligations by suppliers,
totaling 24% of annual consumption
Market parties
Italy Strategic storage of 4.6 bcm
Ministry sets the volume, storage compa-
nies dedicate to strategic storage reserves
Poland
Compulsory stocks of companies equivalent to at least
30 days of average daily imports of the gas brought in
Minister of the Economy and gas suppliers
Spain
Mandatory storage obligations for gas shippers, strate-
gic stocks equivalent to 20 days of their ﬁrm sales in the
previous natural year (4.78 bcm)
Spanish Government and gas suppliers
Source: Bruegel. Note: mcm = million cubic metres.
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MGSM) and intermediate sales (which are not).
A last option would be to impose the obligation on
consumers. But given the large number of
consumers, it would be hard to justify the admin-
istrative effort.
How large would the security margin be?
The size of the security margin should be
determined at EU level, on the basis of an agreed
definition of what constitutes an emergency
situation. A very basic approach would be to oblige
importers/producers to maintain a fixed share,
such as 20 percent of contracted gas demand for
1 year. A more sophisticated approach would be
to link the security margin to the importer’s or
producer’s sources of gas. Similar to capital
requirements for banks, there could be different
risk-ratings for different types of supplies, which
would also incentivise diversification.
What would count towards the security margin?
It would be up to each importer or domestic pro-
ducer to choose how to structure its portfolio to
meet the required security margin.
This might be done from a wide range of options,
more or less costly:
i. Interruptible contracts with industrial clients; 
ii. Storage; 
iii. Option contracts with LNG suppliers, includ-
ing the reservation of the import capacity;
iv. Option contracts with pipeline suppliers;
v. Swap contracts with other countries’ suppliers
(eg switching Algerian pipeline supplies from
Spain to Italy in case of emergency);
vi. Domestic production margin (particularly in
the Netherlands);
vii. Fuel switching8.
Importers and domestic producers would define
their portfolios of flexibility options accordingly,
seeking to find the optimal solution in order to be
more competitive than their counterparts. For
obvious reasons, optional additional volumes
from already pivotal suppliers (such as Russia)
should not be allowed to become part of the
security margin. 
portfolio of flexibility options; (2) national
solutions undermine the internal energy market;
many unilateral security of supply policies either
exclude foreign providers (eg storage obligations)
or unduly favour domestic suppliers; and (3) the
EU Treaty explicitly calls for solidarity in this area.
Considering these factors, and with the aim of
minimising the cost of ensuring supply security
and preserving the internal gas market, we
propose to combine the enhanced planning of
European infrastructure with a new EU market for
a gas security margin (EU-MGSM).
THE EU MARKET FOR A GAS SECURITY MARGIN
To maintain a sufficient level of flexibility in the EU
gas system, to make it available when needed and
to disincentivise excessive dependence on indi-
vidual suppliers, we propose the creation of an EU-
MGSM. This would operationalise the supply
standard (Art. 8 in Regulation (EU) No 994/2010),
which so far has not been implemented. An EU-
MGSM would clearly define and credibly transpose
the supply standard, prevent double counting and
reduce the cost of the standard itself and shield
the internal market.
Simply put, to the EU-MGSM would extend the
existing gas storage obligations adopted by some
member states for security of supply reasons
(Table 2) to the EU level, and would include all of
the gas system’s flexibility options. 
Who would be obliged to hold a security margin?
Under the EU-MGSM, each importer and each
domestic producer would be legally required to
have available a certain amount of alternative
supplies7. This would be relatively straightforward
because only a limited number of importers and
domestic producers are active on the EU market.
Domestic producers would be included to avoid
any discrimination, and because the failure of a
large domestic producer could constitute a
supply-security event. 
Alternatively, the obligation could also be applied
to domestic suppliers. This, however, would be
difficult because it is difficult to identify a clear
basis for the supply margin as it is difficult to dis-
tinguish final sales (which are relevant for the EU-
7. This would require legal
definitions of importers and
domestic producers,
possibly with some thresh-
olds on source and size to
keep administrative costs
in check. 
8. This is essentially an
interruptible gas supply
contract with a gas
power plant.
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9. The association of
Europe’s transmission
system operators (TSOs).
10. According to Art.2 (2) of
Regulation (EU) No
994/2010, each member
state has to designate a
competent authority to deal
with gas security of supply.
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/
sites/ener/files/documents/l
ist_ms_competent_authori-
ties.pdf
The cost of drawing on the flexibility options in
case of emergency should be notified by the
importers/domestic producers to the national
regulators each year. Possibly there might be a
price cap to prevent importers/producers from
posting excessive prices. 
How is the security margin activated?
Being an emergency mechanism, the EU-MGSM
would require uncomplicated governance. This
might involve three players: the Council of the EU,
the European Network of Transmission System
Operators for Gas (ENTSO-G)9 and national com-
petent authorities.
In a situation of sudden gas supply disruption, the
EU Council would declare the emergency situation
and give two mandates (Figure 4):
i) To a dedicated security of supply taskforce to
be created within ENTSO-G; this taskforce would
coordinate the infrastructure aspects of the oper-
ation;
ii) To the national competent authorities10, which
would ask suppliers to put the required security
margin into the market.
Under the oversight of the ENTSO-G taskforce, gas
flows from country A to country B should smoothly
proceed, on the basis of the required capacity
booked on the infrastructure for the security
margin. The dynamics would follow a sort of con-
centric-circles pattern, with the closest country
with available supply helping the neighbour in
need of supply.
Only in cases of security crises would suppliers
be allowed to draw on the EU-MGSM. Otherwise
there might be a risk that governments would take
political decisions to use the system in periods of
high prices to artificially reduce prices – which
would undermine the market and thus reduce
private investment incentives and ultimately
compromise supply security. 
What will it cost?
The cost of the security margin will be driven by
two main components: the cost of maintaining the
flexibility options and the cost of reserving the
corresponding transport capacity, plus some
small amount of administrative cost. The cost will
initially be borne by the importers/producers
but will be partially passed through to the final
consumers.
The EU-MGSM would reflect regional diversity.
Because of different infrastructure endowment,
producers/importers in less-interconnected
regions will find it more costly to ensure security
of supply than those in well-interconnected
regions. Consequently there would be an appro-
priate disincentive to invest in inflexible gas-
consuming assets (eg must-run chemical plants)
in regions where gas security is more costly.
How can it be ensured that the margin would be
available where needed?
In order to guarantee the deliverability of the
required security margin, the importers or the
domestic producers will have to book the neces-
sary transport capacity to bring the security
margin at any point in time to the delivery point
(at which the importer/domestic producer deliv-
ers its commercial volumes). Booking of firm
capacity to enable delivery of the security margin
will provide the right incentive to extend capaci-
ties to transmission system operators (TSOs),
storage operators or LNG terminals that are
already close to their capacity limits. 
But this market-based approach will not be
enough to ensure that the required gas can be
made available in any member state. Additional
measures for the development of an appropriate
European infrastructure will need to be put in
EU Council declares emergency situation
Mandate to the 
ENTSO-G SoS Taskforce
to coordinate infrastructure
aspects
Mandate to the national 
competent authorities 
to ask suppliers to put
the security margin 
into the market
Figure 4: The governance of the EU EU-MGSM
Source: Bruegel.
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place. In this respect, the Ten Year Network
Development Plan (TYNDP) (ENTSO-G, 2015)
developed by ENTSO-G should play a greater role
in identifying the true bottlenecks and encourag-
ing cost- efficient solutions. To promote proper
coordination of gas infrastructure development at
EU level, the role of the Agency for the Cooperation
of Energy Regulators (ACER) should be enhanced.
It should be provided with sufficient tools (model-
ling capabilities, staff) to evaluate the cost-effec-
tiveness of proposed EU gas infrastructure
developments. Proposals from other parties (out-
side of ENTSO-G) should also be considered.
For projects that are not part of the TYNDP, the rel-
evant national regulator should need to demon-
strate that they are not detrimental to EU energy
policy objectives, before they give their approval.
THE POLITICAL ACCEPTABILITY OF THE EU-MGSM
Economic considerations will not be sufficient
to secure approval for an EU-MGSM. Political
acceptability will also be a fundamental
prerequisite to enable the creation of such an EU-
wide mechanism. 
There are significant differences between member
11. Because of increasing
demand in Asia, and
also in response to stronger
decarbonisation policies.
states in terms of energy mix and security of gas
supply structure. This variety represents a
substantial obstacle to the development of an
EU-MGSM, because member states currently
endowed with more security of gas supply options
might not be in favour of their citizens paying for
an insurance mechanism that they might not per-
ceive as necessary because gas supply security
risks are generally portrayed as issues only for
central and eastern EU countries that rely heavily
on Russian gas.
However, as we have discussed, as EU gas imports
increase, the security of supply issue will become
more pressing and structural. Furthermore, Russia
should not be considered the only potential threat
to the security of EU gas supplies. The geopolitical
situation of the EU neighbourhood is extremely
complex and volatile and other key suppliers
might unexpectedly and unpredictably become a
threat. In addition, market conditions might
change over time in an unfavourable manner. For
instance, the currently loose LNG market might
well tighten11. In this context, an EU member state
that today might not perceive security of gas
supply as a direct threat, could become vulnerable
in the future.
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